Fresh evidence about how cells in frontal cortex make decisions has come from experiments in which information is partly withheld from them.
We tend to think of decisions as agonised and protracted processes, as when deciding where to go on holiday. But such scenarios represent only a very tiny proportion of the incessant decisions that we make subconsciously. For instance, whenever we move our gaze to a new visual target a choice has been made between all the possible objects around us that might be worth looking at; and as we make two or three such movements every second of our waking lives, this alone represents a rather impressive degree of decisiveness. And these are just decisions about movement: all the time we are also making sensory decisions about what we think is out there, on the basis of information from our senses.
Precisely because the processes leading up to these decisions are hidden from us, we enjoy a robust, confident picture of the world that belies the fact that sensory signals are uncertain, the consequences of actions unpredictable. We think we see, but actually we guess. As Venn [1] pointed out in 1907: "What an ordinary glance takes in, when directed towards a surface, is nothing more than a succession of points which are filled in and supplemented by something other than sight. How obstinately our senses refuse to undertake the drudgery of examining every separate detail in the objects we inspect, even when we are gazing upon them with some care, is only too well known to those who have ever worked through a proof sheet as it came from the press. The almost inevitable impulse is to visualize a few letters and thence to infer the whole word, and even from part of a sentence to infer the rest and it requires a strong and persistent effort to insist that the eye shall not thus shirk its work of adequate observation". Thus, perception is a matter of hypotheses that must be judged against one another, by seeing which are best supported by whatever meagre clues filter through our senses.
As a result of this decision-making process, our reaction times are much longer than would be expected from simple consideration of the delays in sensory receptors, muscles, and the nerve fibres and synapses that link them up. Procrastination rules: cortical levels of the brain keep the lower ones in check while they evolve their own responses, more sophisticated than the lower levels are capable of achieving, but taking longer to compute. Quantitative analysis of these reaction times, in particular of the random variation that is such a prominent feature of them, leads to a simple model of the underlying process, the LATER -for 'linear approach to threshold with ergodic rate' -model [2, 3] . Here, information arriving from the stimulus causes a decision signal to rise linearly from an initial level to a criterion or threshold level, at which the response is triggered. On different trials the rate of rise is subject to Gaussian variation, which accurately predicts the observed distribution of reaction times.
Figure 1
Activity of a neuron in frontal cortex during a movement discrimination task. The monkey fixated a spot (blue, at top) while above it a pattern of moving dots was presented. The pattern was extinguished, and after a delay the monkey made a saccade to one of the targets (red) on the right or left, depending on whether it judged the motion to be to the right or left. During the trial the activity of a saccade-related neuron with a movement field (pink) that included one of the two targets was recorded. The difficulty of the task could be altered by specifying the percentage of dots moving in the required direction, rather than simply moving at random: these percentages are shown at the left. In each row across, the shaded area represents the period during which the motion was presented, and the vertical green line represents the time of the saccade. Each line of black ticks represents the pattern of action potentials recorded during one trial. On the left, trials in which the saccade was made into the response field (RF) of the neuron being recorded; on the right, trials in which the saccade went the other way. (Data from [7] 
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To have any scientific value, such a model needs to be more than a mere empirical generalisation: it has to make functional sense. One approach to evaluating function is to ask how an ideal system for making decisions would behave. Mathematically, this process of updating one's estimates of the likelihoods of different hypotheses in the light of new evidence can be described by Bayes' Law.
When an event E is observed, which provides evidence about some hypothesis H, the likelihood L(H) of the hypothesis is increased by a factor proportional to p(E|H)/p(E), the probability of observing E, if H were true, normalised by the probability of E itself. Every time E is repeated, L(H) will increase by the same factor. Thus, if H is the hypothesis that a certain stimulus is present, then the continuing appearance of the stimulus will give rise to sensory stimulation -evidence E concerning Hthat will cause L(H) to rise. Final acceptance of the truth of H could then correspond to L(H) attaining some fixed criterion or significance level.
The parallel with the LATER model is obvious: its linear rate of rise corresponds to the arrival of evidence, the starting level to the prior likelihood L(H), and the threshold to the significance level at which H is accepted to be true, and action is initiated. Studies in which the prior probability of targets is systematically altered [4] confirm this correspondence quantitatively, and experiments recently carried out in my lab by Ben Reddi similarly appear to demonstrate that the threshold level is indeed altered by changing the degree of urgency, substituting speed for accuracy. The only puzzling feature is the random variation of rate of rise from trial to trial, which appears to be due, not to noise in sensory signals, but to a process of gratuitous randomisation within the brain. But it results in randomness of choice between competing possibilities, and there are good biological reasons for making our actions to a certain extent unpredictable [3] .
The ultimate test of a quantitative model such as LATER is, of course, whether there are neurons in the brain that actually behave in the way that is predicted. The initial level of their activity should correspond to prior expectation, and on presenting a stimulus should rise at a rate that is influenced by the rate of arrival of information but also subject to random variation; the time for this activity to reach some fixed level should predict the reaction time. A movement that is particularly appropriate for this kind of study is the saccade, the rapid eye movement that shifts the gaze on to a new target. In the frontal eye fields of monkeys, one set of neurons fulfils some of these predictions rather exactly [5] . These movement cells show a steady build-up of activity just before an appropriate saccade, the rate of rise varying randomly from trial to trial, and the saccade is initiated when the activity reaches a fixed threshold level with a reaction time predicted by the time-course of the activity of the cell itself.
Another class of cells -visual cells -shows a similar but earlier rise in activity after stimulus presentation [6] . The time course here is typically more complex, with the activity reflecting the successive contribution of different kinds of information. For instance, in a distractor task, in which the monkey is trained to make saccades to only a certain class of target (for instance red rather than green, green then being the distractor), the response to the distractor consists of an preliminary, hopeful, rise in response to the initial information that a target is present, followed by a disappointed decline when the neuron finally discovers that the stimulus is green and not red.
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Figure 2
Activity of a frontal eye field neuron in a different discrimination task. The monkey initially fixated a central spot (red). Then four different targets were presented, being all possible combinations of two different shapes and two different colours: the monkey had been trained to make a saccade to one of them, in this case a black cross. At the right, the individual lines of dots show the pattern of action potentials in each of a number of trials, the rows being sorted according to saccadic reaction time (the time of the saccade is shown by the green segments forming the S-shaped curve). The four sets of data correspond to the presentation of each of the four possible targets within the cell's receptive field (pink). Below, the average activity for trials is shown on the same time-scale, for each of the four cases. Activity rises similarly in each case, but falls off subsequently to a degree that depends on the degree of similarity between the target and the stimulus actually presented. Two recent papers [7, 8] have shed considerable light on the neural mechanisms of these processes. Both studied saccade-related visual units in monkey frontal cortex to see what happens when the quantity of information available concerning a stimulus is systematically altered. Kim and Shadlen [7] chose a movement discrimination task, in which a proportion of dots within a field moved together in one direction, while the others moved at random: the amount of information available can then be varied simply by altering the proportion of dots that move together. The monkeys were trained to make a saccade to one of two possible targets, depending on the perceived direction of motion (Figure 1 ). Bichot and Schall [8] used a task in which the correct target was defined by the conjunction of two attributes, colour and shape -for example, a white circle -and studied the responses evoked by stimuli which only partly met the criterion, for example a black circle or a white cross. In a typical trial, all four possibilities were presented at equal distances from the fixation spot, thus creating a more complex version of the distractor task described earlier ( Figure 2 ).
What ought to happen? In both these experiments, what is being manipulated is the amount of information supplied: either in terms of the proportion of dots moving in the designated direction, or in terms of the fraction of constituent attributes that are actually present. In the latter case, Bichot and Schall [8] found the initial response of their units to be very similar, whatever the type of stimulus. But about 120 milliseconds from the time of presentation, the behaviour started to diverge: by around 200 milliseconds, the degree of activity falls into three clear groups ( Figure 2 ). The greatest activity was when the target was indeed present; when only one of the two constituent components occurred (same colour or same shape) the activity was decreased; when neither was present, it was decreased still further.
As this second decrease was roughly the same as the first, it suggests -as would be expected on theoretical grounds, and has been observed empirically [4] -that probability in these units is coded on a logarithmic scale.
It is important to realise that these are not the same class of cells described by Hanes and Schall [5] that embody the LATER model itself: rather, they are likely to represent the visual signal that feeds into the movement cells, and would be expected therefore to alter the mean rate of rise of their activity. Clearly it will be important to verify whether this is so.
Kim and Shadlen [7] presented a greater range of variation of information, but the analysis they performed was less direct than that of Bichot and Schall [8] . Once again (Figure 1 ) it can be seen that, during the presentation of the motion, the activity in the unit either rose or fell, depending on whether the motion was towards or away from the target area, the rate of change depending on the proportion of spots providing information about the motion. From their records, the authors calculate an index representing the extent to which -moment by moment -the degree of activity of the cell correctly predicted the ensuing saccade ( Figure 3 ). It is then very clear that the rate of rise of this index increased with increasing information, the relationship once again being very roughly logarithmic.
In both cases, then, we can see decisions evolving in these neurons in response to partial information, in a way that seems to fit broadly with the kind of scheme represented by the LATER model. In addition, Bichot and Schall [8] have demonstrated a further property of these cells that is related to learning. In the theoretical framework for decision given earlier, it was assumed that the various values of p(E|H) were somehow known in advance. Of course in real life they must be learnt through experience, and this is what constitutes the learning that occurs when we change the reward from say a white circle to a black cross. Such changes of reward leave behind temporary traces of increased p(E|H), evident as a residual elevation of the level of activity for a stimulus that used to be the Dispatch R597
Figure 3
Accumulation of information by frontal neurons. The six lines plot the probability of correctly predicting the final saccade direction from averaged neuronal activity at different times after the onset of the motion (shaded area), for the six levels of difficulty of discrimination shown at the right: the numbers have the same meaning as in Figure 1 . The easier the discrimination, the more rapidly this probability rises at the onset. (Adapted from [7] ). rewarded target but is no longer. This exciting finding opens up the possibility of a new way of studying this fundamental kind of medium-term sensory memory. Indeed this rigorously quantitative approach -securely triangulated by theory, by behaviour, and by actual neuronal behaviour -is surely the way that our understanding of the highest levels of the brain will progress into the millennium.
